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Sabotage! The origins, development and impact of the IRA's infrastructural bombing campaigns 
1939-1997. 
 
At various moments in the twentieth century the Irish Republican Army (IRA) in 
its various incarnations have used the tactic of infrastructural bombing, notably 
in their 1939 attacks in England on Electricity pylons and in the summer of 1971 
in Northern Ireland on its electrical distribution network. In 1996 the British 
Security Service (MI5) foiled an attack by the IRA aimed at causing a total 
electrical blackout of the greater London area, a plan that would have seen 
major disruption in the capital for many weeks or months. Using recently 
declassified material (some, specially released under Freedom of Information 
legislation from this very article) this paper seeks to re-evaluate the impact of 
these IRA infrastructural sabotage campaigns, that have until now either been 
ignored or judged to have been derisory or incongruous failures, this paper 
demonstrates the historical development of this tactic from both the IRA's 
perspective, and that of those who were tasked with hindering it, highlighting 
the devastating potential of such tactics in the future.  
 
 
 
While the IRA used attacks on electricity distribution infrastructure throughout the Northern 
Ireland Troubles, two particular examples will be highlighted in this paper. The first, a short 
campaign in the summer of 1971 against the 275kw main lines that circled the province almost 
completely cut Belfast’s electricity supply. A second, in 1996 was an attempt by the IRA to do a 
similar job in London, cutting the lines at key points around the M25 that, had it not been foiled, 
would have had a profound and crippling effect on the capital’s electricity supply for many weeks. 
The attacks would have followed a series of high-profile attacks on Britain that had included the 
massive 10 February Docklands bomb (that had ended the IRA’s 1994 ceasefire) and the 15 June 
Manchester city centre truck-bomb attack on the Arndale centre. However, just as 1996 did not 
mark the first time that the IRA had attempted to move its bombing campaign to Britain, so too 
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was it not the first time that Irish Republicans had attempted to attack the electricity infrastructure 
in an attempt to damage confidence and instil public antagonism against its government. An IRA 
bombing campaign that ran throughout 1939 had begun with attempts to do just this as well, and, 
as in 1996, to do so without large amounts of bloodshed. The 1939 campaign has of course largely 
been forgotten due to the impact of the Luftwaffe’s follow-up after 1940. However, it was a serious 
attempt by a terrorist organization to achieve their political ambitions through the tactical use of 
violence. This is not always apparent in the literature and, while the failed 1996 attempts were, at 
the time, eulogized by the British Press for their professionalism1, this is curiously not usually the 
case with the 1939 campaign. 
 
The S-Plan and the 1939 England Campaign  
'Friday, in the evening, the landlady shouted up the stairs: 'Oh my God, oh Jesus, oh 
Sacred Heart, Boy, there's two gentlemen to see you.' 
 I knew by the screeches of her that these gentlemen were not calling to enquire 
about my health, or to know if I'd had a good trip. I grabbed my suitcase, containing 
Pot. Chlorate, Sulph Ac, gelignite, detonators, electrical and ignition, and the rest of my 
Sinn Féin conjuror's outfit, and carried it to the window. Then the gentlemen arrived.  
 A young one, with a blonde, Herrenvolk head and a BBC accent shouted, 'I say, greb 
him, the bestud.' '2 
 
 
The opening lines of Brendan Behan's 'Borstal Boy' have, since the 1950s, coloured views toward 
the IRA's 1939 bombing campaign in Britain. Carried out by young, idealistic, though hopelessly 
inept volunteers with little training and no backup, once they left Ireland they were easy prey for 
the British Police and arrested – in Behan's case – within hours of getting off the boat. Leaving 
Behan aside however, the statistics of the 1939 campaign are quite startling by today's standards. 
There were 61 separate bombing incidents in England in the first four months of 1939, and over 
                                                 
1 “They were known as the A-Team, the most powerful squad of IRA bombers ever assembled.” 'Blackout Bombers sent 
down for 210 years', Peter Rose and David Williams, Daily Mail, 3 July 1997. 
2 Brendan Behan, Borstal Boy (London: Hutchinson, 1958); 11. 
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150 that year – equating to a bomb in or around a major British city every other day in 1939.3  
 
Despite the intensity of the 1939 campaign few historians have given it more than a cursory 
glance. Richard English gave 1939 less than three pages4 and Eunan O’Halpin’s recent work5 
devotes even less than this to a topic that cannot have failed to have fuelled British animosity 
toward Ireland in the early war years. Only Paul McMahon, in his recent work6 has provided a 
worthy historical analysis of the documents now available from 1939, however he does so 
exclusively from the point of view of British Intelligence and their burgeoning cooperation with 
their new Irish equivalents immediately before the war, neither of which, McMahon admits, had 
more than a very limited role with regard to the IRA in 1939.  The 1939 campaign was however 
important for its own reasons. First, it demonstrated that violent Irish republicanism had not gone 
away and remained focused on pushing Britain toward a full political and military withdrawal from 
Ireland. Second, they showed that they were prepared to consider new tactics and strategies for 
the fulfilment of their unchanged aim. Third, they specifically set out to avoid gratuitous collateral 
damage to civilian life and lives and expressed an aversion to the loss of life both in Britain and 
Ireland – an aspiration however that inevitably failed, and on the very first day of the campaign, 
attacks in Manchester resulted in the death of one man, killed after a bomb exploded inside a 
manhole on Princess Street.7 
 
                                                 
3 Does not include non bombing incidents. Does include explosives that failed to go off. Statistics taken from 'List of places 
in connection with vulnerable undertakings etc. where outrages have occurred', (1939), Home Office (HO) 144/21357, 
The National Archives of the UK, Kew (hereinafter TNA).  
4 3 of 450, Richard English, Armed Struggle: The History of the IRA , (London: Pan Macmillan, 2004); 60-62.  
5 O’Halpin understandably gives ample treatment to German influence on the IRA in this time.  Eunan O’Halpin Spying on 
Ireland: British Intelligence and Irish Neutrality during the Second World War (Oxford: University Press, 2008); 40-41.  
6 Paul McMahon, British Spies and Irish rebels: British Intelligence and Ireland 196-45 (Woodbridge: Boydell, 2008); 262-
275. 
7 The incident included bombs down electrical manholes at Hilton Street, Whitworth Street and Mosley Street, HO 
144/21357, TNA. 
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While Behan's portrayal of his young self may or may not be characteristic of the IRA's 1939 
volunteers, certainly in Borstal Boy he correctly portrays the attitude engendered in the British 
public as a result of the IRA's campaign, 
'Outside as we got in the car, a few people shouted: 'String the bastard up. Fughing Irish 
shit-'ouse.' It was an Orange district, but I think some of them were Liverpool-Irish, 
trying to prove their solidarity with the loyal stock.'8 
 
 
The planning for the campaign Behan, and hundreds of others took part in, began in the autumn of 
1938. As Neville Chamberlain met Adolf Hitler in Munich, the IRA's Seamus O'Donovan began work 
on a plan to attack Britain – and specifically England – using a formulated and measured form of 
terrorism he described as the 'S-Plan'. Short for Sabotage, the S-Plan foresaw a campaign of 
Terrorism with a small 't', foregoing public violence and bloodshed, by deliberately attacking 
targets the public would neither see nor hear but, all the same, would affect their everyday lives in 
a way that would attune them better to the propaganda efforts essential to the success of the 
campaign. The bombs were initially to be timed to coincide with the renewed fear of war with 
Germany, and the Chamberlain government's perceived weakness toward Ireland (having just 
returned the Treaty Ports of Cobh, Berehaven and Lough Swilly to the Irish 'Free State'9 
government).   
 
O'Donovan's S-plan had the support of the IRA's Chief of Staff, Sean Russell and the head of the US 
based fundraising group Clan na Gael, Sean McGarrity10 and in November of 1938 the IRA began 
                                                 
8 Brendan Behan, Borstal Boy (London: Hutchinson, 1958); 13. 
9 The Irish Free State was established in 1922 under the terms of the Anglo-Irish treaty, until 1937 when De Valera’s 
constitution renamed the state Éire. While the legal and constitutional status changed again in 1948 to The 
Republic of Ireland, the IRA, having consistently rejected the authority of the Irish state since 1921, continued to 
use the term ‘Free State’ derisorily.   
10 Sean Cronin, The McGarrity Papers, (Tralee: Anvil, 1972). 
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recalling activists based in England for training in Ireland with a view to beginning in the following 
month. O'Donovan took charge of the training as well, holding sessions at Killiney Castle, in an 
affluent suburb of Dublin. In fact, O'Donovan was the perfect originator of the S-Plan; he was a 
trained Industrial Chemist and had served as Michael Collins’ 'Director of Chemicals' (i.e. 
Explosives) in the War of Independence11. After the Civil War he had joined the Irish Free State's 
Electricity Supply Board, and had spent more than ten years working for the rural electrification of 
the country as a civil engineer.12 This experience gave O'Donovan insight into many different types 
of engineering, and his papers include instructions on how to disable locomotive engines and 
destroy bridges without the use of explosives.13 O’Donovan was also in contact with Nazi Germany, 
and met with the Abwehr on three occasions in 1939, in 1940 aiding among others the German 
agent Ernst Weber-Drohl before being interned by the Irish government in 1941. O'Donovan's real 
contribution however was his insight into the disruptive effect damage to electricity distribution 
lines would have on England's cities.  
 
O'Donovan believed that Northern Ireland could be reunited with the South if public opinion in 
England alone could be changed. O'Donovan wrote, 'The issue is complete national 
independence... which must be fought out between the IRA, representing the Irish Nation, and the 
British. This effort must have the dignity of a National Struggle and must not allow itself to be 
reduced to a local squabble as between the IRA and the Free State Government or between the 
IRA and the Northern Government, for the control of either part of the country... Civil War must be 
avoided at all costs.'14 O'Donovan's S-Plan thus represented a working-out of the means with which 
                                                 
11 Uinseann MacEoin, The IRA in the Twilight Years 1923-48 (Dublin: Argenta, 1997). 
12 Tim Pat Coogan, The IRA (London: Pall Mall, 1970); 123. 
13 'Demotion of Bridges without explosives – instructions', James L. O'Donovan, Papers related to the IRA, 1930s and 40s, 
MS 21,155, Folder 5, National Library of Ireland, Manuscripts Department. 
14 'IRA Aims', Folder 4, Ibid.  
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the British mainland could be attacked without the need for the establishment of vulnerable 
supply lines from Ireland. In papers marked, 'IRA Aims' O'Donovan made it clear that IRA units, 
once present, would be left on their own to carry out their missions, 'There will be no transport of 
materials from this country to England.'15  
 
Thus the targets in the plan were restricted to the public infrastructure surrounding the cities of 
London, Birmingham, Liverpool and Manchester. Most specifically electricity pylons, telegraph and 
telephone cables, post boxes and government offices, the object was to make life uncomfortable, 
to inconvenience ordinary people with the bombing campaign, while at the same time, dazzling 
them with a parallel propaganda campaign. The S-Plan ruled out attacks against vulnerable public 
amenities such as Water and Gas – specifically the pollution of public water supplies – were ruled 
out because, 'apart altogether from ethical considerations, the Hague Convention representing 
civilized international opinion and agreement condemns all such actions and we should be doing 
Ireland and our cause infinite harm by adopting any such means.'16 This principal applied generally 
to moving trains, where sabotage could take place at night, or at electrical junction boxes.17 The S-
Plan categorically stated that rolling passenger trains themselves would not be targeted. 
  
The campaign was delayed however by the death of the IRA's Officer Commanding England – killed 
by his own bomb at a border post on the Tyrone-Donegal border18, and, while McGarrity in New 
York declared that the first bombs had exploded in December 1938, in fact it took until 12 January 
1939 for the ultimatum signalling the start of actions to be sent to the Home Secretary and the 
bombing did not begin until the 16th. Within three days, fourteen separate attacks had been made 
                                                 
15 Ibid.  
16 London Metropolitan Police captured ‘S-Plan’, p.8, HO 144/21357, TNA. 
17 ‘This form of attack [against the rail network] is most desirable since it can inflict no personal injury’ Ibid.; 11.  
18  'Two Killed in Irish Explosion' The Times, 30 November 1938. 
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against power stations, pylons and cables in and around London, Manchester and Birmingham.  
 
The Police response was swift and quite measured. Metropolitan Police Special Branch called for 
the immediate arrest of the usual suspects. This was followed by the successful conviction of 18 in 
London, 10 in Manchester and 3 in Birmingham in the two weeks following the initial explosions.19 
These arrests represented 40% of IRA members in these cities and 25% of the total number of IRA 
members resident in Britain at the time; certainly a satisfactory figure for a short month's work.20 
With these arrests came a copy of the S-Plan itself and the Home Office informed all the public 
utility companies of the situation and advised them to upgrade their security. With these two 
measures the IRA were forced to diversify their tactics prematurely. They had not caused the 
severe disruption to the electricity supplies of any city targeted and began instead targeting tube 
stations, canals, Post Offices, bridges and telephone inspection boxes. With their resident IRA 
groups gone, the volunteers being sent from Ireland had no opportunities to store or stockpile 
materials and often used contacts they met within the Irish community itself, or took risks and 
stored their explosives in their own digs, much of which was quickly sniffed out by the keen-noses 
of England's landladies. The tactical sprawl enforced by the sudden clampdown by the Met meant 
that the IRA campaign could no longer have any coherent effect. And, while in April a conference 
of Chief Constables, sought additional powers of arrest and detention from the Home Office, by 
this stage the campaign had already become little more than one of petty vandalism and arson. In 
March, noting the lack of attacks made against armaments firms and the armed forces, Vernon Kell 
of MI5 refused to be drawn into investigating 'these gangsters', noting that the Security Service 
                                                 
19 Memo for Sir Norman Kendall (Chief Constable) from New Scotland Yard Special Branch, 13 April 1939, HO 144/21357, 
TNA.  
20 Figures based on 1936, not counting IRA non-residents sent over for specific operations. Sean Cronin, The McGarrity 
Papers (Tralee, Anvil, 1972); 166. 
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'has had nothing whatever to do with this illegal organisation for over twenty years.'21 
 
The campaign continued intermittently however throughout the summer of 1939 and in August a 
bicycle carrying a bomb exploded in Birmingham killing five bystanders. The arrest, conviction and 
execution of two men linked with the bomb's manufacture aroused ill feeling in Ireland and among 
the Irish in the United States. Clan na Gael used the Sacco and Vanzetti model of protest in their 
attempts to save Barnes and McCormack22 and Time magazine even covered their execution23   and 
while this created something of a breeze of publicity for the IRA in early 1940, the world's 
attention had at this stage moved onto bigger things. The Birmingham bomb was an exceptional 
case, and most incidents after March 1939 involved the use of small incendiaries against post-
boxes and the release of tear-gas in cinemas.24 The campaign ended in early 1940 when two 
bombs exploded on London's Oxford Street, injuring more than twenty bystanders. Arguably these 
two bombs – the last of the S-Plan campaign were designed only as protests against the executions 
of Barnes and McCormack. Upon hearing the explosions while drinking in a bar on Edgware Road 
two former members of the Irish Police had shouted 'Up the IRA! and 'Up the Republic!' and were 
quickly arrested.25 
 
Until now, historians have been content to conclude that the 1939 England campaign was yet 
another example of the Fenian activist tradition that has periodically bubbled to the surface since 
                                                 
21 Kell to Alexander Maxwell (HO), 9 March 1939,  HO 144/21357, TNA.  
22 Peter Barnes and James McCormack (aka James Richards) in memoriam pamphlets contained in HO 45/25550, TNA. 
23 ''Ultimate Cause'' Time Magazine, 19 February 1940.  
http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,763505,00.html   
24 Notably the IRA used women for the operations against cinemas. Tim Pat Coogan, The IRA (London: Pall Mall, 1970); 
127. 
25 One senior police officer commented, 'The two drunken Irish wasters... ought to be sent back to Ireland.' Minute Sheet, 
MEPO 3/1303, TNA.  
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1798.26 This, and the fact that the campaign was an unmitigated disaster for the IRA. Both of these 
arguments are correct in their conceptions. A republican lineage can be drawn from the 1939 
campaign back to 1916 as well forward to the Provisional IRA of the early 1970s. So too can 
O'Donovan's own judgment that the campaign 'brought nothing but harm to Ireland and the IRA'27 
be justified by the losses of man-power and momentum caused by so many IRA volunteers being 
imprisoned in both British and Irish jails, during the Second World War – a direct result of the 
bombing campaign. One can even go further however and say that the campaign, while easily 
mopped up by the British police, still resulted in the cornerstone of British counter-terrorist 
legislation in the June 1939 Prevention of Violence Act introduced by Home Secretary Sir Samuel 
Hoare.28 This Act, though it was to expire in 1953, was the direct ancestor of the 1973 Prevention 
of Terrorism Act and arguably all proceeding counter-terror legislation in the UK, thus it had a 
major impact on how Britain has dealt with terrorism right up to the present day. Certainly the 
British government did not, at the time, treat the 1939 campaign with the same lack of interest as 
historians now. Significant steps were taken by the British in this time to improve security around 
perceived IRA targets and, beside the warnings given to the electricity companies, guards were 
reinforced around Downing Street and Chequers.29 At Westminster, all the public galleries were 
closed by the Speaker despite being informed that, 'orders had been issued to these terrorists to 
avoid taking of human life.'30 
 
A final outcome of the 1939 campaign was in the British public's perception of the Irish in Britain, 
                                                 
26 Richard English, Armed Struggle: The History of the IRA , (London: Pan Macmillan, 2004) ; 61. 
27 Stephan Enno, Spies in Ireland  (London: McDonald, 1963) ; 38. 
28 An act that would eventually evolve into the Prevention of Terrorism Act 1974, and more recently the Terrorism Act 
2006. 
29 Enhanced protective security measures for Chequers and Downing Street during the IRA’s 1939 campaign are described 
in MEPO 3/1908 and MEPO 3/1910, TNA.  
30 Metropolitan Police Commissioner, note of meeting with House of Commons Speaker (E.A. Fitzroy), 4 February 1939, 
MEPO 3/1909, TNA.  
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illustrated earlier by Brendan Behan (who was arrested in the weeks following the Birmingham 
bomb). It seems that, by veering off O'Donovan's original primary targets and moving on instead to 
targets of opportunity like left-luggage offices, tube stations or cinemas, the campaign began to 
have exactly the opposite effect desired, bringing to the fore again old anti-Irish and anti-Catholic 
feeling in parts of England that had not died out. In fact, British anti-irish prejudice was far more 
commonplace than one might assume; in a children’s book of poems published in 1925 for 
example was still the verse,  
‘The Irish child can dance a jig,  
And share its pillow with a pig, 
And where we ask for pie or meat,  
The ‘pratie he is glad to eat.’31 
 
 Immediately following the start of the 1939 campaign there was a resurgence of supposed 
Catholic oaths as evidence of conspiracy. One contemporary note of a ‘Hiberian [sic] Oath founded 
by Rory O’Moore 1565’32 was typically worded; ‘I will wade knee-deep in Orangemen’s blood, and 
do as King James did’33 and vowing ‘I will think it no sin to kill and massacre a Protestant whenever 
the opportunity serves.’34  This particular publication met with the Home Secretary’s personal 
response in the midst of the S-Plan campaign that, ‘As a matter of fact I had seen it before. It has 
been circulated on various occasions in recent years.’35  The destruction and deaths being caused 
by the IRA in Britain was not going to be conducive to ending Partition in the way O'Donovan had 
planned so long as British opinion continued to view Irish Republicanism as Catholic conspiracy.  
                                                 
31 John Archer Jackson, The Irish in Britain (London: Routledge, 1963); 157.  
32 ‘Hiberian Oath’, enclosure to letter, Lord Ampthill to Samuel Hoare, 13 May 1939, HO 144/21357, TNA. 
33 Ibid. A Home Office reader of a very similar text that appeared in 1928, noted at this point in pencil, ‘He ran away, I 
thought!’ 
34 Ibid.  
35 Samuel Hoare to Lord Ampthill, 16 May 1939, HO 144/21357, TNA.  
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Thus we can see that O'Donovan's S-plan was not the plan that was carried out in England in 1939, 
and the main focus of the plan – electrical infrastructure – was abandoned due to the arrest of key 
figures early in the campaign. The fact that the first wave of attacks had not caused the major 
blackouts and industrial disruption they had set out to achieve and was indeed met with a swift 
and devastating response by Special Branch was disheartening for those who remained and forced 
a premature re-think as to the S-Plan's effectiveness. Recent research has pointed out that 'The 
IRA's British units did not refer to the S-Plan, rather they improvised with the available explosives 
and lowered their sights accordingly... it did not create a situation that would force the British to 
negotiate'.36 This aspect is not apparent in some of the older literature dealing with the 1939 
campaign that, as recently as 1970, believed the main primary targets to be 'obvious military 
targets, communications centres, BBC transmitters, aerodromes, bridges and military 
installations'37 and has led to some confusion over the objectives of the S-Plan in the first place. 
Richard English, for example remarked 'it is unclear precisely how the IRA anticipated that it would 
produce the desired result.'38 In fact the plan was far more subtle than Coogan suggested back in 
1970. O'Donovan had planned to disengage the people and the economy from the government 
temporarily in order to allow the propaganda message to get through. The government, losing its 
hold over its own people would quickly move to negotiate directly with the IRA rather than be 
embarrassed further. Propaganda would be used in combination with infrastructural bombing (and 
later some general mayhem) to force Britain to cancel its union with Northern Ireland by force, not 
of arms, but by removing its ability to govern effectively. But still, the assumption was that Britain’s 
hand could be forced through the use of coercive violence in Britain – and of course this was also a 
                                                 
36 Gary McGladdery, The Provisional IRA in England (Dublin: Irish Academic Press, 2006); 45.  
37 Tim Pat Coogan, The IRA (London: Pall Mall, 1970); 123. 
38 Richard English, Armed Struggle: The History of the IRA (London: Pan Macmillan, 2004); 61. 
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plan that would fail for the Luftwaffe too in little over a year’s time.  
 
This may have been a tall order, but in many instances the basic assumptions were correct. 
However, there was no propaganda campaign in Britain aimed at educating the British public as to 
the goals of the IRA's campaign (even had they been prepared to listen), and Sean Russell left 
Ireland for the United States in April where his attempted disruption of King George VI's visit 
earned him a spell in US custody before he travelled to Germany via Italy in 1940 to seek the 
assistance of Nazi Germany (he died famously in July 1941 on a German U-Boat on its way to 
Galway). Russell therefore, was not playing the S-Plan out in any way close to what O'Donovan 
(who had himself visited Nazi Germany) had made clear. Though this would not be the last time 
that the IRA would try out this tactic and, when used again with the right balance of other forms of 
disorder, infrastructural bombing could bring a government quite quickly to a state of breakdown.  
 
Northern Ireland 1971 
The IRA split in December 1969 created two different factions with very different ideas as to the 
types of operations an IRA should perform. While the 'Officials', became a primarily defensive 
force, the 'Provisionals' under Ruairí O'Brádaigh, sought to go on the offensive as quickly as 
possible and use attacks against British forces that now included the British Army, to demonstrate 
the colonial position of Northern Ireland. This tactic, the Provisionals hoped, would snowball their 
support base, forcing the British Army to identify the PIRA as their primary enemy and move them 
away from operations designed to keep Protestants and Catholics apart and into a counter-
productive, counter-insurgency mode.39  
 
                                                 
39 Ed Moloney, A Secret History of the IRA, (London: Allan Lane, 2002); 100. 
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The problem was that it had been the Provisionals and not the Officials who had been the splinter 
group in late 1969 and the unevenness of the split meant that most of what remained of the guns, 
experience and know-how remained on the side of the Officials and, as the Provisionals were 
predominantly a Northern movement, on the wrong side of the border.  
 
Thus, as the northern Provisionals in early 1970 lacked manpower, expertise and arms they were 
forced to improvise with tactics and materials very early on. Sniper attacks and erratic fire from 
Thompson guns on British troops became the hall-mark of the early Provisional IRA and it took 
them over a year and 100 such attacks to kill their first British soldier.40 But these public attacks 
masked the training in bomb-making that was going on behind the scenes, and a reversion to the 
type of infrastructural bombing seen in the 1939 S-Plan. 
 
This said however, it was loyalists and not republicans who fired the first shots of the 
infrastructural campaign in the early Troubles. In April 1969 the UVF temporarily crippled Belfast's 
water supply and the ensuing political fall-out resulted in the resignation of Terence O'Neill as 
Northern Ireland Prime Minister. It was not however apparent at the time that these attacks had 
come from loyalists rather than republicans and, while tactically well executed, they were one-off 
operations and not part of a concerted campaign (which arguably came later with the largely 
successful Ulster Workers’ Council Strike of 1974).  
 
The IRA soon followed the UVF’s tactics, initially bombing electricity pylons sporadically in late 
1969 and then stopping quite quickly and moving onto other targets of perceived higher political 
value, burning public buildings, shops, etc. and keeping the security forces spread out. With a 
                                                 
40 Gunner Curtis, killed by a single bullet from a Thompson gun, 6 February 1971. Thomas Hennessey, The Evolution of the 
Troubles 1970-72 (Dublin: Irish Academic Press); 66. 
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mounting campaign the IRA returned to infrastructural bombing in the summer of 1971 and within 
weeks had virtually crippled Northern Ireland's electricity supply in an offensive that continued 
despite the introduction of internment without trial on 8 August 1971.  
 
Historians have thus far failed to describe the attacks on Northern Ireland’s electricity 
infrastructure in the summer of 1971 as a concerted campaign.41 Indeed, excepting the statistical 
data, histories of this time mostly ignore this aspect of the early Troubles, preferring to deal with 
the urban guerrilla war that made headlines at the time and breaking the IRA’s actions into two 
parts – against urban military and urban economic targets.42 Richard English's work on the IRA, for 
example when dealing with 1971 focuses mostly on the seething rage felt by many young Catholics 
that drove them into the Provisionals and in turn drove the Provisionals to become more fiercely 
anti-Army.'43 Bishop and Mallie, while they mention an explosion at a substation which killed the 
man planting the bomb,44 make no attempt to highlight the idea that this might have been part of 
any concerted or separate sphere of IRA action. Even Thomas Hennessey's otherwise 
comprehensive new work on 'The Evolution of the Troubles' makes note only of a bomb in early 
1970 outside the Belfast Corporation Electricity Club (one the PIRA's first ever bombs) and a 
particularly callous April 1971 attack on the Electricity Board's head office in Belfast, which injured 
many young female office staff. However, attacks on infrastructure were neither the classic military 
or economic targets (typified by fire-bombs in city centre shops and businesses which were 
designed to take security force pressure away from Catholic areas). Infrastructural attacks had both 
                                                 
41 There is no mention of the IRA’s bomb attacks on Northern Ireland’s electricity network in the following works, Richard 
English, Armed Struggle: The History of the IRA (London: Pan Macmillan, 2004), J. Bowyer Bell, IRA Tactics and Targets 
(Dublin: Poolbeg, 1997), Martin Dillon, 25 Years of Terror: the IRA’s war against the British (London: Bantam, 1996), 
Tim Pat Coogan, The IRA (revised edition, Glasgow: Fontana, 1987) and J Bowyer Bell, The Irish Troubles: a generation 
of violence (Dublin: Gill and Macmillan, 1993).  
42 Ed Moloney, A Secret History of the IRA, (London: Allan Lane, 2002); 100, and MLR Smith, Fighting for Ireland: the 
military strategy of the Irish republican movement (London: Routledge, 1995); 96. 
43 Richard English, Armed Struggle: The History of the IRA (London: Pan Macmillan, 2004); 137.  
44 Patrick Bishop and Eamonn Mallie, The Provisional IRA (London: Heinemann, 1987); 138. 
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different modus operandi (using high-explosives as opposed to incendiaries) as well as a different 
operational goal – to further undermine the Northern Ireland government. Thus Ed Moloney also 
misses out on any reference to a 1971 infrastructural campaign when he writes, ‘the targets were 
not just military and police bases but increasingly included government and commercial 
premises.’45 Infrastructural attacks were key as well as, by the summer of 1971, this was one of the 
only areas that the Stormont government continued to act without British interference.46 The fact 
that no mention is made in any recent research to attacks made against electricity pylons or 
substations in the weeks before or after internment is therefore astonishing considering the impact 
these attacks had on Northern Ireland government thinking at the time.  
 
From May to November 1971 there were at least 13 successful attacks on the main electricity 
distribution system of Northern Ireland. Reports of pylon and transformer attacks are made in The 
Times on 21 May, 19 June, 13 July, 1 August, 13 September and 7 November, the Northern Ireland 
government mention additional attacks in June 1971 at Hannahstown and one south of the border 
severing the North-South interconnector in July.  Additionally, on the 8 August the IRA managed to 
cripple Ballylumford's B-station, crucial to Belfast's electricity supply, particularly when faced with 
attacks being made to the main distribution lines south of the city that linked Belfast to the 
province's only other major power station at Coolkeeragh and the, already damaged, North-South 
Interconnector. Though most of these attacks failed to make any headlines, the Northern Ireland 
government nevertheless took them very seriously. A Ministry of Commerce memo for the Cabinet 
commented, 'While the Ballylumford B station remains out of service the whole electricity system 
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of NI is at very serious risk.'47 On 23 August, there was the attack on the Electricity board's 
Headquarters, on the 29 August, in another calculated attack, unreported in the British press, the 
IRA cut the 3 lines between Ballylumford A and Belfast; this was followed by an attack on the main 
Coolkeeragh line through Co Tyrone as well as other attacks on spur lines in the south of the 
Province. For the Northern Ireland Government the repercussions were very serious, the Minister 
A. C. Brooke told the cabinet:  
'We are in a position that any further sabotage could break the integrated 
electricity system and we should be dependent on the engineers to get power 
from whatever generating stations through whatever lines are available. … we 
may find ourselves at any time having to make power cuts. We may also have 
to consider whether we should be ready to declare a state of emergency.'48 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                  49 
                                                 
47 Memo on Electricity situation marked SECRET, 23 August 1971, Com 58/3/1, Public Record Office of Northern Ireland 
(hereinafter PRONI).   
48 A. C. Brooke (Perm Sec) Min Commerce NI Memo to Cabinet, 1 September 1971, CAB 9F/227/3, PRONI. 
49 Reproduction of diagram showing IRA damage to Northern Ireland's electricity grid by August 1971, Com 58/3/1, PRONI. 
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The IRA seemed not to have realised how close they had come to crippling the Northern Ireland 
government, and, after early September, the attacks subsided quite dramatically. Such was the 
knife edge on which supply was balanced, however it was estimated that just a few more cuts in 
the supply lines would have cut off the entire eastern area of the province for between an 
estimated 2 and 14 days.50 For Sir Kenneth Bloomfield, Assistant Cabinet Secretary at the time in 
Stormont, 'it was rather to our surprise that the thing died out. It was almost as if it had been the 
brain child of somebody or another and that somebody disappeared from the scene.'51 In fact, it is 
not certain why the IRA ceased their attacks – whether through arrest, or an inability to determine 
exactly how close these tactics were bringing them to their initial goal of bringing down Stormont 
by creating ‘the perception of chaos and ungovernability.’52 Certainly, command structures within 
the Provisional IRA in 1971 were more fluid than they were later and it was still then possible for 
the campaign to have been conducted without the explicit backing of the Army Council. Thus, 
when one or more of the middle-ranking leaders were arrested, the entire project collapsed.  
 
Of course all this took place within the context of the introduction of Internment, which must have 
played a key role.  Introduced on 8 August 1971, Internment resulted in a massive increase in 
republican activity on all fronts as a knee-jerk, guttural reaction to the perceived repression of 
Catholics, and arguably this short campaign was deemed to be a part of this. The Northern Ireland 
government however saw the campaign as a cold, calculated attempt to usurp their governance, 
through the crippling of essential infrastructure. When looking at where and when the attacks 
were made, it is clear that, in this case, the Northern Ireland Government had escaped by the 
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narrowest of margins, using the minor and spur lines to divert supply. In their own words;  
'A serious threat was posed to the electricity supply by IRA sabotage of the 
highest merit [at Ballylumford]... in August 1971, which was followed by a 
two month campaign against the transmission system. Supply was not 
affected by this largely because it took place when the demand for electricity 
was seasonally low.'53 
 
So narrow the margins in August 1971 that one of the first priorities of the British Government 
upon imposing Direct Rule was the investigation of contingencies in case of further IRA sabotage 
campaigns.54 
 
It is unclear whether those responsible for the 'skilled sabotage'55 particularly in August and 
September 1971 were ever caught or convicted. Research from the IRA's perspective does not 
suggest there was any great mastermind behind the campaign or any clear link to insider 
knowledge.56 One of a number of possibilities is one John James Quigley a 30 year old electrician 
and IRA bomber imprisoned in October 1971 for the 21 May bombing of an electricity substation 
and a later July attack on a branch of BHS57 but the IRA used a number of electricians as bomb-
makers, any one of which, with the necessary experience, could have masterminded the plan. 
What is certain is that the attacks led directly to the abandonment of the North-South 
Interconnector in 1972, the abandonment of plans for a Northern Ireland Nuclear Power Station 
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earmarked for the southern shores of Lough Neagh or at St John's Point near Ardglass, Co Down58 
and the acceptance of the need for an additional, large conventional power station to ensure the 
security of supply to Belfast.59 Thus, in real terms, 1971 represents the most successful IRA 
infrastructural campaign, one that seriously shook the Stormont government's grip on power, 
although not the last and certainly not the most ambitious of the IRA's infrastructural campaigns.   
 
London: 1996 
Although after 1971 and indeed throughout the Troubles the IRA used sporadic bomb attacks on 
electricity pylons and substations to spread the security forces as widely possible, not until 1996 
did they return to the idea of launching a concerted campaign again, this time, not against 
Northern Ireland, but, like in 1939, London was to be the target.  
 
Like in 1971, the campaign seems to have been designed as a short-sharp-shock, mixing a variety 
of different tactics but with the centre-piece being attacks on London's electricity infrastructure, 
just like in 1939. Several Active Service Units were involved in Britain at the time and their 
operations included the February 1996 Docklands bomb and the June 1996 Manchester truck 
bomb – which, at over 3,000 lbs, was the largest IRA bomb ever detonated in Britain. The 
Docklands bomb had a huge impact on the way in which the capital was policed. Metropolitan 
Police Commissioner Sir Paul Condon warned Londoners, 'We do our very best to minimise the risk 
of terrorism, but we can only ever minimise it, you can never in a large, open, democratic city 
guarantee that there will never be a terrorist incident.'60 Nevertheless, the so-called 'Ring of Steel' 
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placed around the city of London in the wake of the Bishopsgate bomb in 1993, was reinstated 
within hours and a similar system was announced for the Isle of Dogs within weeks of the 
Docklands bomb.61   
 
Minimising the risk of further IRA actions in the capital was, by 1996, also the responsibility of MI5 
who had been given responsibility for countering IRA operations in Britain in 1992 following the 
IRA's near miss on Downing Street's Cabinet Room during the Gulf War in 1991. MI5, while it had 
overall responsibility for 'terrorism' generally, when it came to Northern Ireland, it had only overall 
responsibility for loyalist activity outside the province, and Republican activity outside the UK. It 
was traditionally the London Metropolitan Police Special Branch, who had the lead role when it 
came to the IRA in Britain.62 Within months of the Dockland's bomb, two IRA Active Service Units 
had been arrested in the capital, using MI5 led investigations. One had been planning a repeat of 
the Manchester bombing in London, the other an S-Plan style concerted attack on London's 
electricity infrastructure.  
 
The sabotage group, a five or six man Active Service Unit was brought together in Ireland at the 
start of the summer of 1996 and given a fairly detailed plan for the operation they were to carry 
out. The group consisted of experienced IRA men some with long and fairly distinguished IRA 
careers. Gerard Hanratty, for example, had been an IRA member since 1979, and alleged in court 
that while in prison for a separate offence he had been in contact on behalf of the IRA with Patrick 
Mayhew, Secretary of State for Northern Ireland.  John Crawley was another member of the group 
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with a long career in the IRA. A former US Marine, Crawley had been an instructor in explosives at 
Quantico before joining the IRA in the early 1980s and in 1984 participating in the Valhalla/Marita 
Ann IRA gun-running plot between Boston and Kerry, intercepted by the Irish Navy using 
intelligence from the FBI and SIS. Crawley was sentenced to ten years by an Irish court.63 Donal 
Gannon, was also in the group, he was the bomb maker suspected to have been involved in the 
earlier Manchester attack.  The group was understandably described by one police officer as 'the 
A-team', and by another as, 'some of the most important and experienced players they have sent 
over here for some years.'64 
 
Conscious of the increased security in London following the Docklands bomb the group had moved 
quietly into London on false passports, rented houses without outgoing telephone lines, and lived 
only in areas they could blend in unnoticed. They were shown initial plans and carried out dry-runs 
of the attacks in Ireland, taking elaborate precautions to ensure they were not followed.65 But 
further reconnaissance was required, and the group, while in London, borrowed the Electricity 
Supply Handbook from Battersea Library – removing from it the map of the National Grid – and 
conducted additional dry-runs against the six targeted facilities themselves.  
 
Unbeknownst to the group their actions had already made them open to MI5 and Metropolitan 
Police Special Branch surveillance and they were already being tracked down and followed. Peter 
Rose and David Williams suggested during the trial that MI5 were alerted exactly because the IRA 
had chosen such an experienced team well known among the IRA and its RUC informants alike. 
When they disappeared from their usual locations, British Intelligence got wind that something 
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major was being planned.66 MI5 acted quickly to mount what became one the largest surveillance 
operations of its history, involving 300 detectives and agents under the name Operation Airlines.67 
 
The carefully chosen locations for the bomb attacks were six electricity switching stations located 
around the greater London area, roughly encircling the M25.68 According to the prosecution, the 
group planned to plant 37 devices in total, each packed with 2.5kg of Semtex, that, had they 
exploded, would have blacked out London completely for two days, and led to further disruption 
for an additional 35. Obviously this would have caused major disruption for Londoners, and 
possibly chaotic scenes creating an energy crisis on a national scale. Politically the timing was also 
perfect, the Major government was not popular (hovering at between 25% and 33% in opinion 
polls throughout the year)69 and this would have been a distinct challenge to its authority. 
Hanratty, the leader of the group, claimed the boxes were to be filled with icing sugar rather than 
Semtex, though he did not deny the plan was to disrupt electricity supplies and embarrass the 
government. Whether explosives were present or not, the plot would have had roughly the same 
effect, closing off substations for many hours while bomb-disposal teams dealt with the numerous 
suspect devices. In his defence, Hanratty argued, 'If the IRA was capable of closing down London 
without going into London, it made the Ring of Steel null and void.'70 Certainly no explosives were 
actually found in the group's possession. The group were sentenced to 35 years each, the judge 
considering the dangers posed by electricity shortages to the thousands of sick and infirm living in 
the capital and those who would have died in accidents caused by the blackout told them 'You'll 
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find no mercy here!'71 
 
In many ways the 1996 operation, despite its interception by Britain’s security services, showed a 
practical and professional approach to IRA operations planning that had been missing in both the 
idealistic approach of the 1939 and the seemingly accidental approach of 1971; the 1996 campaign 
in Britain (that included bombs at Canary Wharf, Hammersmith Bridge and the Arndale Centre in 
Manchester) arguably demonstrated the maturity and discipline of the Provisional IRA as a group 
by the late 1990s. As, while due to the critical nature of electricity in the 1990s as opposed to the 
1930s, their attacks would have caused far greater disruption to ordinary life. So too did they 
realise that, in and of itself, such bomb attacks, timed between the 1994 and 1997 ceasefires, were 
not designed any longer to rid Ireland of the British occupation overnight. The 1996 attacks must 
be seen as part of a process and thus we see continuity in the development of the S-Plan mixed 
with a lowering of ambitions as to its possible political effect. The IRA, while they had undoubtedly 
planned their 1996 attacks while technically on ceasefire, were also planning their next ceasefire 
(enacted 19 July 1997) while carrying out their 1996 attacks.72  
 
Conclusions  
While attacks against infrastructure are not the monopoly of the IRA – not even in these islands – 
their use by Irish republicans since 1939 shows remarkably little change in their modus operandi. 
While their substance might not have changed, their proficiency in tactical planning did. Irish 
republicans often express great interest in their own past, often justifying their very existence by 
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the blood sacrifice made by previous generations. Learning from, and being conscious of both their 
mistakes and their successes in the past is crucial to understanding not only how such a 
sophisticated plot could come together in 1996, but also in understanding the movement of the 
IRA away from violence. It is doubtful that the IRA's Army Council in 1996 knew precisely how 
close their infrastructural campaign had come to success in 1971 (although at this stage, 
contingencies for the collapse of Stormont and its replacement by Direct Rule along the lines 
established in March 1972 were already clearly defined)73 but they had also become far more 
realistic in their ambitions for any campaign mounted in Britain and no longer expected these 
attacks to magically reunite Northern Ireland harmoniously within some new Republic as in 1939 
and 1971. By 1996, bombs in Britain were about political pressure both within the republican 
movement itself (between the Army Council and Sinn Féin) and externally between the Major 
Government (its majority hinging on the votes of Unionist MPs) and broader Irish nationalism. In 
both cases they were timely reminders of the cold ability of the IRA in the 1990s, a professionalism 
clearly juxtaposed by the amateurish image of the young Brendan Behan being arrested off the 
Liverpool boat with a suitcase full of dynamite.  Despite this, as with Behan, the 1996 IRA unit were 
captured and arrested before being able to carry out their planned attacks. The increased technical 
ability of the IRA was therefore being at least matched by that of British Intelligence and Special 
Branch for them to have staved off so decisively the IRA’s own ‘A-Team’.  
 
While the IRA have never been the only guerrilla movement to have used sabotage, their 
avoidance of casualties on a truly mass scale do separate them categorically from groups both 
preceding and subsequent who have actively targeted civilians to a much greater extent than the 
Provisional IRA ever did. Tellingly for the post 9/11 world, in O'Donovan's S-Plan, besides the ban 
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on poisoning of public water supplies so too prohibited were attacks on the fire services, 'for 
humanitarian reasons' and against flying aircraft, lest 'delay action [bombs]... occur during flight'74 
options that Al Qaeda, for example, have never ruled out.   
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